Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Theory

Motivation (Example)

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		Incumbent	
		Fight	Not
Challenger	Enter	0,0	2,1
	Not	1,2	1,2

Game Tree



		Incumbent	
		Fight	Not
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

- **Players**:

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

- **Players**:
  - The incumbent and the challenger.

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

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

- **Players**:
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- **Terminal Histories:**

Game Tree



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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- **Preferences:**
  - On the tree.

Extensive Game with Perfect Information

Definition

An **extensive game with perfect information** consists of:

- a set of **players**,
- a set of sequences (**terminal histories**) with the property that no sequence is a proper subhistory of any other sequence,
- a function (the **player function**) that assigns a player to every sequence that is a proper subhistory of some terminal history, and
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- Actions are not specified but can be inferred from terminal histories; that is, $A(h) = \{a | \, (h, a) \text{ is a history}\}$.

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A **strategy** of player i in an extensive form game with perfect information is a function that assigns to each history h, after which it is player i's turn to move, an action in $A(h)$.

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Definition

A strategy profile s^* in an extensive form game with perfect information is a **Nash equilibrium** if for all players i,

$$u_i\left(s_i^*, s_{-i}^*\right) \geq u_i\left(s_i, s_{-i}^*\right) \text{ for all strategies } s_i.$$

Strategies (Example)



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

- Player 1's strategies are:

#		
1		
2		
3		
4		

Strategies (Example)



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4		

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

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#	Choice at x_1	Choice at x_3
1	C	G
2		
3		
4		

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

- Player 1's strategies are:

#	Choice at x_1	Choice at x_3
1	C	G
2	C	H
3		
4		

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

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1	C	G
2	C	H
3	D	G
4		

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

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3	D	G
4	D	H

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

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#	Choice at x_1	Choice at x_3
1	C	G
2	C	H
3	D	G
4	D	H

- Player 2's strategies are:

#	
1	
2	

Strategies (Example)



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1	C	G
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3	D	G
4	D	H

- Player 2's strategies are:

#	Choice at x_2
1	
2	

Strategies (Example)



- Player 1's strategies are:

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1	C	G
2	C	H
3	D	G
4	D	H

- Player 2's strategies are:

#	Choice at x_2
1	E
2	

Strategies (Example)



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4	D	H

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1	E
2	F

Finding Nash Equilibria (Example)



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

	E	F
CG		
CH		
DG		
DH		

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

	E	F
CG	1 2	
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

	E	F
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Subgame

Definition

Let Γ be an extensive game with perfect information, with player function P. For any nonterminal history h of Γ, the **subgame** $\Gamma(h)$ following the history h is the following extensive game.

Subgame



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

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

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

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



Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium

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A strategy profile s^* in an extensive form game with perfect information is a **Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium** (SPNE) if the strategy s^* is a Nash equilibrium for every subgame.

Every Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.

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

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

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

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

Definition

A strategy profile s^* in an extensive form game with perfect information is a **Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium** (SPNE) if the strategy s^* is a Nash equilibrium for every subgame.





Every Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.

Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (Example)

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

Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (Example)





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





Backward Induction

- Backward induction works as follows.
    - One starts at the very last subgame;
    - in that last subgame, one finds the equilibrium;
    - the subgame is, then, replaced with the respective equilibrium payoffs;
    - the process continues in the penultimate subgame and so on and so forth until you reach the very first subgame.



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- A SPNE always exists.



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

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- A SPNE always exists.
- Backward induction always provides all SPNE.



Backward Induction (Cont.)



Exercise on Finding all SPNE

- Find all SPNE (s_1^*, s_2^*).



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

$$(A, JLP)$$

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

$$(A, JLP) \quad (A, KLP)$$

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

$$(A, JLP) \quad (A, KLP) \quad (B, KLP)$$

Exercise on Finding all SPNE

- Find all SPNE (s_1^*, s_2^*).



$$(A, JLP) \quad (A, KLP) \quad (B, KLP)$$

$$(C, KLP)$$

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

$$(A, JLP) \quad (A, KLP) \quad (B, KLP)$$

$$(C, KLP) \quad (A, JMP)$$

Exercise on Finding all SPNE

- Find all SPNE (s_1^*, s_2^*).



$$(A, JLP) \quad (A, KLP) \quad (B, KLP)$$

$$(C, KLP) \quad (A, JMP) \quad (B, KMP)$$

Recall our Motivational Example